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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of credit market frictions on labour market outcomes. I
build a tractable search and matching model of the labour market with firm dynamics and hetero-
geneity in productivity and size. Firms produce output using labour, which they hire in a frictional
market modelled by a directed search approach, and capital which they rent period-by-period. First,
I show that the interaction of search and financial frictions slows down the reallocation of labour
and capital from low productivity to high productivity firms and therefore prolongs the recession
following a financial shock. Second, I find that the credit tightening reduces the net employment of
large and productive firms more than small and unproductive firms, consistent with recent empirical
findings.Third, I find that the introduction of financial frictions enhances the ability of the model
to explain the fluctuation and persistence observed in output and labour market flows during the
great recession. In fact, the model can account for 50% of the increase in unemployment during the
2008-2010 recession.
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1 Introduction
The collapse of financial markets during the 2007/2008 recession was accompanied by a large deterio-
ration in the labour market. In the UK, while GDP and labour productivity fell by 6.23% and 4.76%
respectively, the unemployment rate increased by 47.96% according to National Office of Statistics
(ONS)1. Over the past few years, there has been a question whether a shock to an economy’s financial
sector can produce a large and lasting distortion in the labour market. In order to answer this question,
this paper develops a tractable search and matching model of the labour market with firm dynamics
and heterogeneity in productivity and size, in which I introduce a frictional credit market where firms
borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint.
In this environment, idiosyncratic productivity shocks create a motive for labour and capital to move
from low productivity to high productivity firms. Nevertheless, the existence of collateral constraints
limits the ability of high productivity firms to rent capital and therefore affects their behaviour in
the labour market. In the presence of collateral constraints, productive firms have a sluggish upward
adjustment of labour and capital as they need to grow their asset stock gradually. Conversely, firms with
falling productivity are hesitant to lay off their workforce. This is because the hiring decision entails an
irreversible search cost, therefore there is an option value for falling productivity firms to postpone their
layoff decision in case of a rise in future productivity. In this environment, the interaction of labour and
financial market frictions reduces the reallocation of resources from unproductive to productive firms.
What is the impact of a credit tightening in this environment? If the collateral constraint tightens,
productive firms are further constrained and therefore hire even less workers. Unproductive firms are
either less constrained or not constrained. They face a lower cost of keeping their workers which
comes from a general equilibrium effect on reducing wages and a lower search cost of hiring since
they face less competition from productive firms. Therefore they are less willing to shrink and further
postpone their liquidation decision. Consequently, labour market frictions cause delays in the layoff
decisions of unproductive firms and capital market tightening reduces the hiring of productive firms.
This interaction between labour and capital market frictions generates a delay in the reallocation of
labour and capital and therefore deepens the recession.
My model builds on Schaal (2015) and Kaas and Kircher (2014) and extends their frameworks by
introducing a frictional credit market. Despite being a large and heterogeneous economy, this framework
keeps its tractability by using the convenient property of block recursivity. The model is then estimated
by simulated method of moments to a range of moments pertaining to aggregate variables. I first show
how a collateral tightening affects total unemployment rate, job creation, hiring, firing, entry and
exit of firms through its impact on the reallocation of resources. Second, by tracking the hiring and
layoff decisions of firms with different size and productivity, I find that the credit tightening reduces
the net employment of large and productive firms more than small and unproductive firms. This is
1For a broader picture of this distortion please look at Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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consistent with recent empirical findings of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012)2 that reports initially
large firms are more sensitive to aggregate changes than small firms. Third, I demonstrate that the
introduction of a frictional credit market improves the ability of the model to explain the change in
labour market outcomes during the previous crisis. For instance, this model can account for 50% of
the increase in unemployment rate between 2008 and 2011. However, even though the model generates
persistence, a financial tightening alone does not seem sufficient enough to explain the persistence of a
high unemployment rate during the Great Recession.
Moreover, I study the impact of a TFP shock in this framework by decomposing and comparing
the response of the model to a fall in aggregate productivity and a financial tightening. The impact of
financial tightening is different from that of a TFP shock. A general finding from my analysis is that
a drop in productivity increases the reallocation of resources toward more productive firms. This is in
contrast to underlying mechanisms of financial tightening. A negative productivity shock reduces the
value of all firms and has cleansing effect. It results in unproductive firms exiting the market and shifts
the distribution of workers to more productive firms and that increases the reallocation of resources.
However, credit tightening has the opposite effect caused by the interaction of financial and search
frictions. This effect is different across the distribution of firms depending on the productivity and
wealth of firms3.
In order to illustrate the extent of collapse in the UK financial markets and its impact on firms,
it is useful to look at the change in lending to firms during the Great Recession. Figure 1 shows the
quarterly monetary financial institution lending to private non-financial firms. Apart from a small drop
in the beginning of 90s, the total lending to non-financial corporation increases quite rapidly from the
1960s until the great recession where it experienced a fall by more than 30%. Moreover, the Credit
Condition Survey (CCS) indicate that the availability of credit has fallen by about 45% between 2007
and 2009 and that there has been a slight recovery since, see Figure 2. Another interesting observation
is that the credit situation has been very heterogeneous across firms. Firms which managed to increase
their debt between 2007 and 2009 have also increased their level of employment. In contrast, firms
which faced a decline in their debt decreased their employment. This is illustrated in Figure 18. This
figure shows the mean log change in employment from 2007 for two groups of firms. As depicted in
the figure, employment increased in both groups of firms from 2005 to 2007 by the same amount, while
after 2007 employment has grown by more than 5% among the increasing debt group of firms while it
has decreased by around 4% among the firms with decreasing debt. This correlation may indicate the
importance of financial market imperfections for the labour market outcomes, although the relationship
2In a different setup with wage posting, on the job search and markov contracts, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013)
provide another intuitive explanation for the same empirical findings that large employers have more cyclical job creation.
3In a dynamic heterogeneous firms model Melitz (2003) shows how a further increase in exposure to trade leads to
additional inter-firm reallocations towards more productive firms. Cui (2014) looks at the capital reallocation across firms
and explains why this reallocation is more procyclical and more volatile than investment. Khan and Thomas (2013) Study
the capital misallocation caused by a collateral requirement shock in a real business-cycle model with heterogeneous firms
and capital rigidities.
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of course cannot be given any causal interpretation.
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Figure 1: Quarterly amount of monetary financial institution lending to private non-financial corpora-
tions (in sterling millions) seasonally adjusted (Source: Bank of England).
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Figure 2: The overall change to availability of credit provided to the corporate sector (Source: Credit
Condition Survey - Bank of England)
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Figure 3: FAME: UK annual firm level data. The blue line corresponds to firms who increased their
debt from 2007 to 2009 and the red line corresponds to firms who decreased their debt from 2007 to
2009. Both lines show the change in mean log employment from 2007.
Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it relates to a growing literature on the impact
of financial frictions in macroeconomics, especially on the labour market outcomes. The modelling of
financial frictions in this paper is similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where borrowing is restricted by
a collateral constraint. However, I abstract from the feedback effects of the asset prices to the collateral
constraint. Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Buera, Jaef, and Shin (2015) and Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh
(2014) use the same way of modelling for financial markets. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) look at the
impact of debt versus equity financing on the dynamic of real and financial variables. Zetlin-Jones and
Shourideh (2014) investigates the importance of external financing for privately and publicly held firms
and study the significance of financial shocks on the output. The main difference between this paper and
theirs is that this work introduces a frictional labour market to an economy with frictional financial
market and heterogeneous firms and look at the interaction of these two frictions when a financial
tightening is happening. I show that since the response of constrained and unconstrained firms are
different to a reduction of collateral constraint, their behaviour change differently in the labour market
and that generates novel implications for how the credit shock affects the aggregate economy.
Although Buera, Jaef, and Shin (2015) also features the interaction of labour and financial markets
but in their paper entrepreneurs hire in a centralized and competitive market where the labour market
frictions are introduced by an interferes with the re-entry of unemployed workers to that market. The
salient difference between this paper and their work is to have a frictional labour market in the spirit
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of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, where job finding is taking place in a frictional environment and the
degree of these frictions depend on the ratio of total available vacancies to the number of job seekers
which is an endogenous object. This environment let me study the difference between the intensive and
extensive margins of firms hiring as well as their entry and exit decisions when the market condition
changes. Zanetti (2011) and Garin (2015) also study the impact of financial shocks to the labour
market in the aggregate level while they are abstracting away from firms heterogeneity. Instead here I
emphasis on the fact that a financial crisis is a boom time for unconstrained firms and that is caused
by the interaction of financial and labour market frictions.
This paper is also related to another strand of literature which introduces search and matching
frictions to the models of firm dynamics. Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) and Elsby and Michaels
(2013) introduce the notion of firm size to the DMP models by a decreasing return to scale production
technology for firms. The first paper assumes that wages are determined by continuous bargaining
between workers and firms and shows that response of unemployment rate and market tightness are
considerably more persistent than benchmark models. Elsby and Michaels (2013) instead combine
the approaches of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with the empirical findings of Steven J. Davis
and Schuh (1996) by providing an analytical framework. However, following Kaas and Kircher (2014)
and Schaal (2015) this paper uses a competitive search mechanism in the labour market. The block
recursive property of the competitive search enables me to compute the out of steady state dynamics
of the model without using approximation methods. Kaas and Kircher (2014) assume a convex cost of
vacancy posting in their framework and show that firms can achieve faster growth by offering higher
wages. But Schaal (2015) shows that the introduction of time varying idiosyncratic volatility to a
model with heterogeneous firms, competitive search and decreasing return to scale can improve the fit
of search and matching models to explain the business cycle moments though the uncertainty alone
cannot account for the persistence observed in the previous crisis. The contribution of my paper is to
introduce a new dimension of financial markets to this literature and look at the interaction of frictions
in labour and credit market which results in a greater degree of misallocation of resources in the case
of a financial tightening.
This paper is organised as follow. In section 2, I explain the model and show the equivalence of
the joint surplus maximization of firms and workers in decentralized market with the planner problem.
In section 3, I calibrate the model and explain the policy functions of firms. In section 4, I analyse
and discus the impact of a credit shock and compare it with a productivity shock and section 5 is the
conclusion.
2 Model
In order to study the impact of financial imperfections on labour market outcomes, I introduce the
notion of firm size to a search dynamic model where heterogeneous firms have decreasing returns to
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scale production technology and in which their borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. The
endogenous hire, layoff, entry and exit decisions of firms in this environment allows me to study the
impact of financial tightening on labour market outcomes. This paper builds on Kaas and Kircher
(2014) and Schaal (2015) and extends their frameworks by introducing a frictional credit market.
The block recursive property of this framework makes its numerical solution tractable by reducing
the dimensionality of this problem since the firms’ policy functions can be solved regardless of the
distribution of employment across firms. This property can only be maintained under the assumption
that prices are exogenous and fixed in the credit market 4. I elaborate on the block recursive property
below and discuss the numerical solution further.
2.1 Preferences, population and technology
Time is discrete and all agents discount future at rate β. The economy consists of a continuum of
workers and firms. The mass of workers is normalized to one. Workers are all risk neutral and infinitely
lived. A worker supplies one unit of labour per period when employed and receives unemployment
benefit when unemployed. Firms are risk neutral and large in the sense that each firm employs a
continuum of workers. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shock z which are governed by a
Markov process, ν(z|z′), on a finite state space Z and A is the aggregate or common component of the
productivity which acts as a source of business cycles in one of the experiments. In each period, a firm
produces output Azf(l, k) where l and k are the amount of labour and capital used in the production. f
is a twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave function satisfying Inada condition. 5 I assume
that labour is hired in a frictional market while the firm rents capital in a competitive capital market
period-by-period.
Each firm pays a fixed cost of operation each period. New entrants are endowed with an initial level
of asset a0
6. They pay setup cost C¯, and draw an initial productivity level z0 ∈ Z with probability
ν0(z0). Each period a firm decides whether to exit or not, whether to hire new workers or lay off current
employees. It also decides on how much capital to hire and on how much of its cash flow to pay out as
dividends and how much to keep in a liquid asset. I use dummy d = {0, 1} to indicate the exit decision
(d = 0 meaning exit) and µ ∈ [0, 1] to indicate the fraction of workforce it wants to lay off.
2.2 Financial market
The firm rents real capital, k, period-by-period. It is assumed that at the beginning of the period, the
firm deposits its liquid assets, a, at a financial intermediary. The intermediary pays the firm a real
return of r on the liquid asset. The intermediary also supplies real capital to the firm at a price of r+ δ
4This is similar to a small open economy assumption.
5fl(0, k) =∞, fl(∞, k) = 0, fk(l, 0) =∞ and fk(l,∞) = 0
6All firms are ex-ante identical and a0 could be interpreted as the initial endowment of the entrepreneur with which
she starts the business after paying the cost of entry.
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per unit, where δ is the depreciation rate. However, the supply of real capital is assumed to be limited
by a collateral constraint k ≤ (1 + λ)a, where a is firm wealth and λ ∈ [0,+∞) represents the degree
of frictions in the financial market. In this setup, λ = 0 corresponds to financial autarky and λ =∞ is
the case with perfect financial markets. The main idea behind the financial frictions is that firms can
use their financial asset as collateral in order to borrow capital. The variable λ represents the ease with
which a firm can obtain capital using its asset as collateral and also it represents the ability of financial
market to reallocate capital across different firms.
2.3 Labour market
Job search is directed. The labour market opens, firms post contracts which they are willing to offer
new hires. Firms which have posted contracts with the identical values compete in the same submarket.
Workers observe the contracts offered by firms and direct their search toward the most attractive offers.
Therefore firms and workers form submarkets. Each submarket is characterized by a market tightness
θ, the vacancy to unemployment ratio. θ represents the relative supply and demand for jobs, and
determines the probability of a match. In each submarket workers find job with probability q(θ), where
q : [0,∞] → [0, 1]: the higher the value of θ, the easier for a worker to find a job, so q is a strictly
increasing function: q′ > 0. In contrast, the higher the ratio of vacancy to unemployment, it is more
difficult for firms to fill their vacancies. I denote the probability that a firm fills a vacancy by p(θ),
where p : [0,∞] → [0, 1] is a strictly decreasing function, p′ < 0. Since matching is always in pairs,
matching probability of workers must be consistent with those of firms, in particular, it must be the case
that q(θ) = θp(θ). I also require the standard assumptions hold: q is twice continuously differentiable,
strictly concave and has a strictly decreasing elasticity. The fact that I express the matching probability
in terms of the ratio of firms to workers θ and not the number of workers and firms effectively means
that I assume a matching technology that is constant returns. As the number of workers and vacancies
doubles, the number of matches doubles, yet the matching probabilities remain unchanged. Moreover, I
assume that firms post a mass of vacancies, so a law of large number applies and there is no uncertainty
regarding the number of workers they recruit. This means that a firm that posts v vacancies employs
exactly vp(θ) workers as is standard in this literature.
Contracts state the promise of firms to workers. For now, I assume that contracts are complete,
state-contingent and there is a full commitment for both workers and firms. Formally a contract is a
set of state contingent wages and retention probabilities offered by a firm:
C =
(
wt+j , φt+j
)
j=0
Where each element of the contaract at time t+j is contingent on the entire history of shocks (zt+j).
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2.4 Timing
The timing is illustrated in Figure 4. Each period is divided into four stages. At the first stage of
period t, new firms enter to the market and their idiosyncratic productivities are revealed. In the
second stage, after the realization of productivities, firms make decisions about possibly exiting at the
end of period. Firms also make decisions about how much capital they want to rent, they pay the
wage bill and operation cost and produce at the end of this stage. In the last stage, firms decide on
dividends, liquid assets for next period and how many workers they want to hire or lay off. Then the
labour market opens, firms post their vacancies and matches are formed.
t t+1 
z 
entry               borrowing/lending       production     hire/layoff --  saving     exit  
Figure 4: Timing
2.5 Workers Problem
An unemployed worker with the value of unemployment U chooses the contract that maximizes his
expected utility of unemployment. Therefore a worker looks at the trade-off between the value of
contract C and the likelihood of getting that contract, q(θ(C)). The more attractive offers are more
difficult to get. If the unemployed worker is successful to get the contract, it will continue with the
value of an employed worker, while if he is unsuccessful, he will receive an unemployment benefit b, and
will search again next period. Therefore the value of unemployment can be written as follow:
U = max
C
b+ β
{
q(θ(C))(1− d)EzW (C, z′) + (1− q(θ(C))(1− d))U
}
(1)
Note that a worker chooses the contract such that it maximizes the expected value of applying for
a job:
ω = max
C
q(θ(C))(1− d)β(EzW (C, z′)− U) (2)
Therefore the problem of an unemployed worker can be rewritten as:
U = b+ ω + βU (3)
An employed worker with contract C who is working in a firm with productivity z receives his wage
w and next period if the firm does not exit and he is not laid off, he will continue as an employed
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worker while otherwise he will become unemployed with probability φ(z) and start looking for a job in
the next period.
W (C, z) = w + β
{
(1− φ)U + φEzW (C, z′)
}
(4)
2.6 Firms problem
A firm enters period t with a stock of asset a it has accumulated, a stock of workers l it has employed
in the past as well as the contracts signed with these workers Cτ . Note that, employed workers hired
by the firm might be on different contracts and therefore each worker is indexed by τ ∈ [0, l] and a
contract Cτ . After the realization of idiosyncratic productivity z,the firm pays the wage bill and the
fixed operational cost, makes a decision about how much capital it wants to borrow and produces the
output. Next, the firm makes a decision about how much asset it wants to save for the next period
and labour adjustment. Therefore, it chooses the number of new hires as well as the contract it wants
to offer them and post the vacancies in the labour market. Finally, firms which want to shrink, layoff
their labour force and firms which have decided to exit, leave the market. The firm’s problem is given
as:
J
({Cτ}τ∈[0,l], l, a, z) = max
d,v,θ,k,a′
∆ + β(1− d)EzJ
({Cτ}τ∈[0,l′], l′, a′, z′) (5)
where: ∆ = pi + (1 + r)a− a′ (6)
s.t: pi = Azf(l, k)− (r + δ)k −
l∑
0
wτ lτ − cv − cf (7)
l′ = (1− µ)l + p(θ)v (8)
k ≤ (1 + λ)a (9)
∆¯ ≥ 0 (10)
a′ ≥ 0, k ≥ 0, l ≥ 0 (11)
ω = max
C
q(θ(C))(1− d(z))β(EzW (C, z′)− U) (12)
Equation (6) shows the firm dividend which is equal to firm’s profit and stock of asset net of what
firm saves as asset for next period. Equation (7) is the firm profit which is firm’s production net of
cost of borrowing, wage bill, cost of vacancy posting and fixed cost of operation. Constraint (8) is
the law of motion for employment within the firm. The number of employed workers at the beginning
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of next period is equal to those who are not separated this period plus new hires. Constraint (9)
is a collateral constraint and shows firm’s restriction in the financial market. Once a firm knows its
productivity, it decides how much capital it wants to borrow. However, the borrowing is limited by
the collateral constraint which is a function of firm’s beginning of period liquid assets. Expression
(10) is a non-negativity constraint on the joint surplus maximization problem of firm and workers.
This is because under a tighter collateral constraint at steady state, firms can find two other ways for
financing. The first one is issuing equity and the second one is borrowing from a risk neutral worker
today and paying him back later such that he receives the same net present value. However, with these
two channels a constrained firm can increase its saving today such that it is not constrained anymore
next period and therefore a collateral constraint does not effectively restrict its access to the financial
market. Therefore, I assume ∆¯ ≥ 0 to block these two channels. I elaborate more on this constraint in
section 2.7 and explain why I do not impose a constraint directly on the dividends of firms. The last
constraint, equation (12) is the workers participation constraint. It specifies the minimum utility that
a contract has to offer in order to attract the worker to apply for the firm.
A new entrant faces a similar problem. It enters the economy with initial endowment a0 and no
labour force, and chooses to remain active only if the expected value of entry covers the entry cost. The
free entry condition implies that at steady state a potential new entrant is indifferent between entering
or not and makes no profit.
∑
z
ν(z)J0(a0, 0, z) ≤ C (13)
This condition implicitly determines the expected value of job search ω and therefore the relationship
between the value of contract and job filling rate.
2.7 Joint surplus maximization
In order to solve the firm’s problem, one needs to keep track of the distribution of contracts within a
firm. However, the full commitment assumption and risk neutrality of workers and firms considerably
simplify the firm’s problem. Therefore, following the literature on the directed search7, I transform the
firm and workers problem into the joint surplus maximization of the firm and workers where wages are
internal transfers between firm and workers and do not appear. The completeness of contracts, the full
commitment assumption and the transferability of utility guarantee that the firm’s problem and joint
surplus maximization are equivalent8. The joint surplus maximization of a firm and its workers satisfies
the following Bellman equation:
7Moen (1997) shows this equivalence in a model where a firm can hire only one worker and Kaas and Kircher (2014)
shows this for large firms.
8Since the planner solution is identical to the one of decentralized economy, the cohort specific layoff probability chosen
by planner is the same as per period layoff decision of a firm. This is explained in appendix A.
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G(a, l, z) = max
d,µ,θ,v,k,a′
∆¯ + β(1− d)EzG(a′, l′, z′) (14)
where: ∆¯ = p¯i + (1 + r)a− a′ (15)
s.t: p¯i = Azf(l, k)− (r + δ)k − bl − ω[l + 1
θ
v]− cv − cf (16)
(17)
Where this problem is subject to (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12). The interpretation of this problem is
straightforward. The joint surplus ∆¯, includes the firm’s flow of output plus its stock of assets, net of
the cost of borrowing, saving for next period, opportunity cost of employment, cost of vacancy posting,
fixed cost of operation and the cost of workers tied to the firm this period. These workers are the
current stock of employment l and unemployed workers 1θv who are applying to get a job at this firm.
The transformation of the decentralized market problem into the joint surplus maximization is
necessary to avoid keeping track of the distribution of contracts within a firm. However, this implies
that it is not possible to impose a constraint directly on the firm dividends without knowing the wages.
Therefore, the constraint (10) can be seen as an equivalence of a non-negativity constraint on the
dividends which puts a boundary on the firm’s issuing equity and borrowing from workers. A collateral
constraint alone without (10), cannot avoid a constrained firm with low level of asset from borrowing,
as this firm can increase its saving today, a′, such that it is not anymore constrained tomorrow9.
2.8 Entry and firm distribution dynamics
Free entry of firms implies that given the aggregate state of economy, the expected surplus of new firm
is equal to the entry cost.
∑
z
ν(z)G0(a0, 0, z) ≤ C (18)
In the stationary equilibrium a constant measure of firms N0 enter the market in every period. The
measure of entrant firms is such that the aggregate resource constraint holds with equality
∑
z
N(z)
[
l(z) +
1
θ(z)
v(z)
]
≤ 1 (19)
This constraint says the total number of employed and unemployed workers tied to all firms has
9A slight degree of risk aversion on the firms and workers side could play the same role as this constraint, although
then it is not possible to transform the problem into the joint surplus maximization.
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to be equal to the unit mass of workers in the economy. Here N(z) is the distribution of all firms, l
is the stock of employed workers and 1θv is the number of unemployed applying for a job at the firm.
In other words, firms entry follow a residual of the resource constraint. In every period a firm with
productivity z and employment l attracts 1θv job seekers according to its policy function and a number
of new entrants N0 enter to the market to absorb the remaining of job seekers.
The law of motion for firms show how the number of different firm types changes from period t to
t + 1. The evolution of firm type depends on the idiosyncratic productivities governed by a Markov
process and the firms’ exit decisions.
Nt+1(z) = [1− d(z)]ν(z′|z)Nt(z) (20)
Also, the distribution of workforce within a firm adjusts given the hiring and layoff decisions made
by the firm. If a firm decides to fire its labour force, it posts no vacancy.
l(zt+1) = [1− µ(zt)]l(zt) + p(θ)v(zt) (21)
2.9 Definition of equilibrium
A competitive block-recursive equilibrium consists of the joint surplus of workers and firms, a utility
promised to workers, a distribution of incumbent firms and a distribution of new entrants.
[J
({Cτ}τ∈[0,l], l, a, z) ,W (C, z), U,N(a, l, z), N0(a0, 0, z)]
such that:
1. Firms decisions (exit, borrowing, saving, hiring and layoff strategies) are optimal. That is J(.) is
the value function and d, µ, θ, v, k and a′ are the optimal policy functions.
2. Workers search strategies are optimal. ω and U are optimal for the workers.
3. Aggregate resource constraints holds:
∑
z N(z)
[
l(z) + 1θ(z)v(z)
]
= 1
4. T (N(a, l, z), N0(a0, 0, z), ω) = N(a, l, z)
5. Complementary slackness condition holds:
∑
z ν(z0)G(a0, 0, z) = C
Condition (1) and (2) state that all firm decisions are optimal. Condition (3) states the total number
of employed and unemployed workers must be equal to one which is the total number of workers in the
economy. Condition (4) states that the optimal state of economy must be such that the optimal actions
of firms and workers cause this state to be reproduced in each period and condition (5) explains that
the entering firms must be willing to enter.
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Proposition 1 When there is positive entry of firms, a stationary competitive search equilibrium exists
and is unique.
Proposition 1 shows that the existence of a solution to the joint surplus maximization of workers and
firms and free entry condition always exists when the cost of entry is sufficiently low. Unfortunately,
the existence of a full block recursive equilibrium with positive entry is difficult to prove under various
different parametrization of this model and with credit constraint. Therefore I check this condition
numerically when I solve the model.
Usually in search and matching models a hiring firm needs to know the worker’s utility value of
unemployment and that often depends on the distribution of other firms which is potentially an infinite
dimensional object. However, in this framework following Menzio and Shi (2010), the competitive
search and free entry condition simplify this problem. Homogeneity on the workers side means that the
unemployed workers are indifferent between applying to new entrants and incumbent firms. Therefore
the entry of new firms adjusts to equate the cost of entry to the benefit of entry regardless of the
distribution of existing firms. Hence, the free entry condition pins down a unique ω independent of the
distribution of incumbents and accordingly a measure of new firms enter to the economy to clear the
labour market. Also one should note that, only the aggregate states of the economy can potentially
enter the workers utility. For example, in this setup, if the common component of productivity A or
the the credit constraint parameter λ changes, then ω should adjust such that in the new steady state
the benefit and cost of entry are equal to each other. Moreover, this implies that the distribution of
new entry is going to be adjusted in the new steady state and interestingly since the distribution of new
entrants depends on the distribution of incumbents, this adjustment will be sluggish. I will explore this
property more in my numerical exercises.
Proposition 2 A competitive search equilibrium is socially optimal.
This proposition establishes that the block recursive equilibrium is constrained efficient. This ex-
tends the results of Kaas and Kircher (2014) to an environment with financial market and collateral
constraint and guarantees that the joint surplus maximization of workers and firms coincide with the
planner’s problem. This implies that given a level of financial constraint, all decisions made by a firm
are identical to their socially optimal levels. This result is even true if the firm can only commit to
promised wages. This is because a firm can set future wages following any sequence of idiosyncratic
shocks equal to the unemployment income plus the expected payoff of applying for a job, b+ω. In this
case the worker does not have any incentive to unilaterally leave the firm as he is exactly compensated
by what he will get in the alternative. Moreover since the flow surplus of any retained worker is equal
to his value in alternative, the firm problem in this case is identical to planner problem. All this results
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hold on the risk neutrality of workers and firms and a slight degree of risk aversion on either side would
result in a different specification.
2.10 Optimal firm decisions
In what follows I take the benchmark calibration of the model and discuss the optimal decision of firms
in the space of asset and labour (a, l) for a relatively low productive firm in the 4th decile of productivity
distribution and a high productive firm in the 8th decile. A firm with low level of asset might decide
to leave the market as it may not be able to afford the fixed cost of operation under a tight collateral
constraint where it cannot freely borrow to increase its production and cover its expenses. That can be
seen in the left down corner of both panels in figure 5. But a similar firm with a higher level of asset
will lay in the layoff area where the firms decide to decrease it’s size to reduce the labour cost but still
stay in the market.
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Figure 5: Firms policy functions
Second, separation tends to occur more in big unproductive firms. The separation area in the left
panel is much larger than the one on the right panel. The firm decides to lay off workers if the expected
value of keeping the labour next period is negative:
Ez
∂G(a′, l′, z′)
∂l
< 0
Moreover, given a level of productivity, separation is also a decreasing function of asset. An asset
rich firm has potentially a higher borrowing limit because of collateral constraint and afford to hire
more capital and employ more workers. In other words, the marginal productivity of labour is higher
in a firm with higher level of asset and the firm tends to layoff less and stays larger.
Third, hiring mostly occurs in small and productive firms since they have a high marginal product
of labour. These firms expand as long as the expected marginal value of increasing the labour force is
higher than expected cost of hiring which is sum of two costs as it is shown in the RHS of below equation:
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expected cost of posting the vacancy plus the expected value that a firm offers to the applicants for the
job 10.
β(1− d)Ez ∂G(a
′, l′, z′)
∂l
>
c
p(θ)
+
ω
θp(θ)
As it is shown on the right panel of Figure 5, the hiring decision of a firm is an increasing function
of its asset holding. A productive firm with low level of asset which has a high marginal productivity
of labour cannot afford to grow large quickly since hiring is costly and the firm does not have enough
assets to borrow against it. It implies that this firm has to expand gradually by increasing its stock of
asset which allows it to relax the borrowing constraint. This upward adjustment of productive firms
becomes more sluggish if the collateral constraint becomes tighter.
And finally for all values between the RHS of first and second inequalities firms are inactive in
labour market. If the marginal benefit of expanding firm is below its marginal cost but still positive,
the firm neither lays off nor hires. Although firms tend to hire more if they are holding more asset but
they tend to lay off much less with higher level of asset and as a result the inactivity area also widen
with asset for both low and high productive firms
Hence, the employment decisions of firms heavily depend on their level of asset holdings and on how
tight the financial constraint is. In a perfect financial market where firms can borrow and lend freely,
employment decisions would be independent of the financial asset position.
2.11 Channels of hiring
A recruiting firm can use two channels to attract unemployed job seekers. It can either offer more
attractive contracts or post more vacancies. However, since the cost of vacancy positing is linear in
the number of vacancies, all firms have the same probability of filling a vacancy. This implies that the
matching rate is independent of the characterises of the firm that posts the job.
Lemma 1 The probability of vacancy filling is identical for all firms.
ω
θ
(−p(θ)
p′(θ)θ
− 1
)
= c
However, the fact that all firms have identical matching rate does not mean that there is no sluggish
adjustment in the model. Small productive constrained firms post fewer vacancies than the optimal
level and they are sensitive to aggregate changes. This feature gives rise to a sensible dynamic at steady
state and also to a sensible aggregate dynamics which is consistent with the evidences from Fujita and
Ramey (2007).
10 1
p(θ)
is the expected time it takes to fill a vacancy
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3 Calibration
I now wish to examine the models quantitative properties. I first calibrate the model to UK data by
targeting a number of moments and I then evaluate its properties.
3.1 Functional forms
The parametrization of the model is as follows: The production function is Cobb-Douglas with two
factors of production which are labour and capital f(l, k) = lαkγ where α and γ are the output
elasticities of capital and labor, respectively. To introduce the notion of firm size, this production
function is decreasing return to scale and therefore α+ γ < 1. Following Menzio and Shi (2010), I pick
the CES matching functions
q(θ) = θ(1 + θγl)−1/γl , p(θ) = q(θ)/θ = (1 + θγl)−1/γl
where γl is the elasticity of matching function. To parametrize γl, following Schaal (2015), I estimate
matching function q by non-linear least square using the job finding rates constructed by Elsby, Smith,
and Wadsworth (2011). For θ, I use the measure of vacancy over unemployment provided by the Office
for National Statistics in its Vacancy Survey/Labour Force Survey 11.
The idiosyncratic productivity is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
zt = ρzt−1 + t, t ∼ N (0, 1)
I discretise the productivity process using Tauchen method with ten grid points.
3.2 Calibration strateghy
Calibration proceed in two steps. In the first step, I set the pre-calibrated parameters exogenously.
These are those parameters which either have direct counterpart in the data, or have been widely used
by other studies. In the second step, I use the simulated method of moments to match the targeted
moments.
The time period is a quarter. I set the quarterly interest rate r to match an annual interest rate of
5 percents (r = (1 + 5%)1/4 ≈ 1.2%). Following Pessoa and van Reenen (2014) I set the depreciation
rate of capital equal to 0.022 which corresponds to an annual deprecation rate of 8.8 percent. I also set
the discount factor equal to 0.98.
The parameters left to be calibrated are the following: the home production b, the cost of posting
vacancy c, the fixed cost of operation cf , the cost of entry C¯, the collateral constraint, λ, and the
11The measure of vacancy over number of unemployed workers can be found at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
datasets-and-tables/index.html
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persistence and standard deviation of idiosyncratic shock (ρz, z), the collateral constraint λ, and the
output elasticity of labour and capital (α, γ).
All the parameters are jointly estimated in equilibrium using the indirect inference but I can identify
which parameter is mostly related to which target. To inform the estimation of the output elasticities of
labour and capital (α, γ), I target an annual capital output ratio of 2.3 and a labour share of production
of 0.64. To discipline the calibration of labour market parameters, (b, c) I target the historical average
of job flow rates: unemployment-employment (UE) rate of 0.31 and employment-unemployment (EU)
rate of 0.012 using the time series constructed by Smith (2011). Since operation cost cf is the main
determinant of exit, I target an average firm size of 15.9 as in the Business Population Estimates of
2007. To discipline the entry cost C, I target an average total vacancy-to-total unemployment ratio θ,
between 2001Q1 to 2008Q1 from ONS. To estimate the collateral constraint λ, I target the mean of debt-
to-asset ratio of 4.22 constructed from FAME. Finally to inform the estimation of ρ, I use the average
unemployment rate in the last ten years before the recession from ONS. And to estimate , I target
the average firm birth rate between 1998 to 2008 using the time series provided by Anyadike-Danes,
Bonner, and Hart (2011).
Pre-calibrated Value Description
z 1 Technology parameter
β 0.98 Discount factor
r 0.013 Interest rate (%5 annual)
δ 0.022 Depreciation rate of capital
γl 1.43 Matching function elasticity parameter
a0 4.43 Initial net worth
Table 1: Pre-calibrated parameters
Calibrated Value Description
b 0.861 Unemployment income
c 1.638 Vacancy posting cost
cf 0.922 Fixed operating cost
C 35.055 Entry cost
λ 4.53 Financial friction
α 0.572 Output elasticity of labour
γ 0.308 Output elasticity of capital
ρz 0.9202 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity
z 0.0503 Standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
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Targeted Moments Model Data
u% 6.80% 6.78%
θ 0.42 0.40
Firm birth rate 0.19 0 .17 (annual)
UE 0.38 0.31
EU 0.018 0.012
Average firm size (labour) 15.3 15.9
Aggregate labour share 0.65 0.64
K
Y 1.8 2.3 (annual)
Mean debt-to-assets ratio 4.21 4.22
Table 3: Calibrated moments
Table 1 summarizes the pre-calibrated parameters. Table 2 reports the calibrated parameters and
Table 3 shows the fit of the model with targeted moments. The overall fit of the model is quite
satisfactory. The model parameters can be interpreted as follows: the value of λ, the collateral constraint
parameter, means that a firm can borrow more than four times of its financial asset. This value is
smaller than the estimate of Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2014) for US, although in their framework
entrepreneurs are risk averse and there is a higher motive for precautionary saving. The value of home
production b, implies that unemployment benefits correspond to 75% of mean workers compensation
in the stochastic steady state which is between the estimated values of Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008). The estimate of the degree of return to scale α+ γ = .88 is in the middle of the
range of estimates in the literature. Since it is difficult to find a widely accepted empirical counterpart
for the cost of entry C, and the fixed cost of operation cf , in the literature, I compare their values to
the average output produced by a firm. The fixed cost of operation cf , is 9.1% of the average output
produced by a firm in a quarter and the cost of entry C is equal to the 86% of the yearly production
of a single firm.
4 Financial Shocks
In this section I evaluate the impact of a financial shock modelled as a tightening of the financial
constraint and I use the model to study how these shocks affect firms in the cross section. Moreover, I
analyse the difference between financial and aggregate productivity shocks and explain the implication
of these shocks in the cross section of firms.
I model the financial shock as an aggregate shock to λ. I suppose that there is an unanticipated drop in
the collateral constraint parameter, λ. Once the shock hits λ, everyone in the economy perfectly know
its deterministic path afterward. Using the credit condition survey, I choose the size of drop so that it
immediately results in a 45% drop in available credit. Following the initial fall, λ reverts to its initial
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level gradually at a rate of 9.5% per quarter. This choice of a mean reversion rate of 9.5% is chosen so
as to match the speed of recovery in the net available credit from CCS. The left panel of figure 6 shows
the change in availability of credit and the right panel depicts the path of collateral constraint λ after
the shock. To proceed further, I first discuss the policy functions of a high and low productive firm
to explain what are the partial and general equilibrium effects of a financial tightening on the firms
behaviour in the labour market. Then I compute the impulse response path of economy as it reverts
back to the steady state under perfect foresight.
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Figure 6: Credit tightening
Policy function- Figure 7 and 8 illustrate how a financial tightening affects the employment
strategy of firms in partial equilibrium, keeping the value of unemployment and the market tightness
fixed, and in general equilibrium for the firms in the 4nd and 8th decile of productivity distribution.
The solid lines depict the exit, layoff, inaction and hiring thresholds before the shocks. The dashed
lines represent how these thresholds are affected when the shock hits.
The optimal decisions of firms are changing with their level of asset holdings. A firm with a low
level of asset might decide to leave the market as it may not be able to afford the fixed cost of operation
under a tighter collateral constraint. That can be seen in the left down corner of both panels in Figure
7. However, a similar firm with a higher level of asset may be in the layoff area where the firm decides
to decrease its size to reduce the labour cost but still stay in the market. If the firm would have even
higher level of asset it may decide to be inactive in the labour market or increase it’s labour force
depending on the optimal policy function. So the labour market behaviour of firms heavily depends on
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their level of asset holdings and on how tight the financial constraint is.
The partial equilibrium effect of a decline in λ is evident. When the collateral constraint becomes
tighter, working capital falls below the optimal level of capital for some firms. This reduces the marginal
value of employment and therefore shrinks the hiring area of employing firms. Moreover, since the value
of employment has gone down the firms are less eager to keep workers and that widens the layoff region.
Also, a fall in marginal productivity makes firms at the margin of profitability unable to cover the fixed
cost of operation and therefore it shifts the exit threshold to the right.
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Figure 7: Firm’s optimal labour policy after financial tightening (partial equilibrium effect)
However after partial equilibrium effect, the forces in labour market lead to an adjustment of the
value of unemployment and market tightness. As firms increase layoff and reduce hiring, the total
number of unemployed works goes up in the economy. This is also exacerbated by an increase in the
number of exiting firms and a decrease in the number of entrants. A higher number of unemployed
workers increases the competition among the workers to find a job and therefore reduces the probability
of job finding and the value of unemployment. Conversely, firms find it easier to hire workers as the
expected cost of filling a vacancy diminishes. A lower value of unemployment means that firms are
facing a lower cost of keeping their labour. The layoff threshold accordingly shifts to the left which has
a strong impact on asset rich low productive firms, see the left panel of Figure 8. Also lower expected
cost of filling a vacancy means that firms are more eager to increase their hiring. This also shift the
hiring threshold to the left and this effect is also stronger for wealthier firms as it is depicted in the
right panel of the same figure.
The total effect of financial tightening is dominated by partial equilibrium effect. I should also
highlight that even if after general equilibrium effect the firms had a wider hiring and inaction areas
one could not make the conclusion that this shock increases the employment. Financial tightening
reduces the value of firms causing an important decline in the number of entrant firms. That is
why the tightness and the value of unemployment fall which allows the incumbents to grow and shift
the thresholds to the left after partial equilibrium effect. The reason behind the strength of general
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equilibrium effect is the entry condition. This means that at steady state the value of entrants should
remain equal to the cost of entry and that necessities a strong reaction of general equilibrium effect.
Therefore a fall in the value of entrants must be compensated by a decline in the cost of hiring which
let the incumbent firms grow larger.
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Figure 8: Firm’s optimal labour policy after financial tightening (general equilibrium effect)
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Figure 9: Firm’s optimal saving policy after financial tightening (4th decile of productivity distribution).
Dark blue corresponds to exit area, light blue is where firm dissave, in yellow area firm does not change
the asset stock and in red area firm accumulate asset.
A financial tightening also affects the saving behaviour of firms. Under a tighter collateral constraint,
firms tend to increase their asset stock to be able to rent more capital. This is depicted in Figure 9. The
left panel shows the policy of a firm in the 4th decile of productivity distribution at the steady state12.
The red colour corresponds to where firms at this level of productivity accumulate asset. When the
collateral constraint becomes tighter, firms reduce their labour cost by increasing layoff and reducing
hiring in order to be able to increase their financial asset to rent more capital. That is why the red
12 The policy functions of other productivity levels look similar where the higher productivity firms will have a wider
red area while low productivity ones have a smaller saving areas.
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area widens after the partial and general equilibrium effects of financial tightening. This also means
that the distribution of firms over asset shifts to the right. Figure 19 shows how the joint distribution
of firms moves after the shock and firms tend to keep higher level of asset13.
Impulse responses- Figure 10 depicts the impulse responses of labour market outcomes and Figure
11 displays the impulse responses of other aggregate variables as log deviation from the steady state.
In what follows I will discuss what this impulse response exercise tells us about the nature of a financial
shock and its impact on the labour market.
First, The tightening of the collateral constraint generates roughly 12% decline in output and
labour productivity on impact. The decline in aggregate output drives mainly from a larger degree of
misallocation of productive inputs across firms compared to the steady state. Constrained firms, who are
experiencing a positive idiosyncratic productivity shock during the collateral shock, experience a much
slower upward adjustment as they need to build up their asset stock gradually to be able to collateralize
their future debt. Therefore, these firms post fewer vacancies and hire fewer workers. Moreover, a
general equilibrium effect amplifies this degree of misallocation. A tightening of the collateral constraint
reduces the demand for labour from good firms and results in lower cost of keeping labour by firms.
Therefore, unconstrained firms that are experiencing a negative shock to their idiosyncratic productivity
during the collateral shock, shrink more slowly along the impulse path and delay their liquidation. Both
of the above effects generate a higher degree of misallocation and reduces the labour productivity and
total output.
Second, the financial shock results in a large fall in total vacancies and hiring. This is caused by
a reduction in hiring of constrained firms, a fall in number of new entrants who do not find it any
more profitable to enter the market under a tighter constraint and also an increase in exit. These
three effects together dominate significantly the mild increase in hiring by unconstrained incumbents.
Third, the fall in job creation and hiring is accompanied by an increase in layoff upon the impact of
shock. These two together generates a high unemployment rate which can roughly explains 50% of the
increase in UK unemployment observed in the Great Recession. Moreover, after the shock, since the
incumbents and new entrants need to accumulate assets gradually, it takes a longer for firms to increase
their employment to the steady state level which prolongs the recovery time. Although the model
is quite successful in generating persistent unemployment rate, but the financial shock alone is not
sufficient enough to explain the persistence of unemployment during 2007-2009 recession. This shows
that introduction of imperfect financial market and credit tightening to search and matching models
can provide an additional propagation mechanism and improve the performance of these models along
different dimensions.
13 The right panel of figure 20 shows the change in CDF of asset distribution. The distribution of asset after the
partial and general equilibrium effects first stochastically dominates the asset distribution at steady state. The change
in distribution of labour is different. After partial equilibrium effect and before the price adjustment in labour market,
firms tend to hire less and fire more, therefore the asset distribution first shifts to the left. However, after the general
equilibrium adjustment, this distribution shifts to the right.
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Fourth, entry and exit react quite sharply to the credit tightening. A reduction in the number of
entrants and an increase in the exiting firms reduce the total number of firms. But to clear the labour
market, the general equilibrium effect reacts strongly by reducing the workers compensation and the
number of entrants goes back to or above its steady state level quite quickly.
Finally, regarding to aggregate variables, the ratio of debt to asset and labour to asset both fall on
impact after the shock, while the recovery of second one is more sluggish than first one. This shows that
firms increase their labour force slower than their debt. Furthermore, the financial tightening results
in a 41% fall on impact in total debt of firms which is comparable to 35% decline in total lending to
private non-financial corporation observed in UK.
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Figure 10: Labour market responses to a 45% credit tightening. (The series are presented in log
deviation from steady state. The time period is a quarter and the shock hits at t = 0. UE is calculated
as the gross flow from U at t − 1 to E at t, divided by total number of unemployed workers at t − 1.
EU is calculated as the gross flow from E at t− 1 to U at t, divided by the total number of employed
workers at t− 1.)
23
0 5 10 15
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
total out put
0 5 10 15
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
total debt
0 5 10 15
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
labour productivity
0 5 10 15
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
average debt to asset
0 5 10 15
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
average labour to asset
0 5 10 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
average labour to capital
Figure 11: Macroeconomic outcomes responses to a 45% credit tightening. (The series are presented in
log deviation from steady state. The time period is a quarter and the shock hits at t = 0.)
4.1 Firm size and productivity distribution
In this section I discuss the impact of a credit tightening across the firm distribution. A large empirical
literature studies how aggregate changes can impact differently on small and large firms. Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) claims that small firms are more vulnerable during financial recession since they are
more reliant on credit to finance their costs. However, a more recent strand of literature such as
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) collect evidences across countries that large firms are more sensitive
to the aggregate shocks. These authors argue that large firms are typically more productive, pay higher
wages and can poach workers from small firms. This means that small firms are restricted by search
and hiring frictions in the boom time to hire workers. Nevertheless, when the economy experiences a
downturn, small firms face less competition from large firms to hire, and thus shrink slower. Since my
model contains both financial and search frictions, it presents an appealing framework within which to
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investigate the empirical findings of the aforementioned literatures. In the following, I explain how the
impact of the credit tightening is different across the size distribution of firms. Furthermore, I discuss
how this heterogeneous response of firms form the aggregate behaviour of the economy and affect the
reallocation of resources from unproductive to productive firms.
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Figure 12: Hiring and layoff responses of productive firms (firms with productivity above the median
productivity) and unproductive firms (firms with productivity below the median productivity) to a 45%
credit tightening (The series are presented in log deviation from steady state. The time period is a
quarter and the shock hits at t = 0).
Figure 12 depicts the change in hiring and firing decisions of productive and unproductive firms.
Under a tighter credit constraint, productive firms which are the engines of job creation are not able
to afford the cost of keeping labour and the cost of hiring if they want to stay in the market. Since
productivity is persistent, these firms have higher expected value for the future. Hence they reduce
their labour cost by increasing firing and reducing hiring to be able to afford the fixed cost of operation
and increase their asset stock under a tighter collateral constraint. Moreover, by increasing the asset
stock these firms are able to grow their ability of collateralizing more debt before the economy converges
back to its previous steady state. In contrast, unproductive firms do not change their hiring decision
as they were not constrained previously. Furthermore, a general equilibrium impact results in a lower
cost of keeping labour and in response, unproductive firms reduce their firing and shrink slower. A fall
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in net employment decision of productive firms through an increase in hiring and decrease in firing,
combined with an increase in the net employment across unproductive firms reduces the reallocation of
resources and further deepen the crisis.
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Figure 13: Hiring and layoff responses of large firms (firms larger than the median size firm) and small
firms (firms smaller than median size firms) upon the impact of a 45% credit tightening.
Figure 13 shows the change in hiring and layoff across the size distribution of firms upon the impact
of the shock. Before the financial shock the hits the economy, I categorise the firms into two groups
of large and small by comparing their size with the median firm size in the economy. Productive firms
tend to be larger than average and unproductive firms are typically smaller. A tighter fall collateral
constraint tends to impact disproportionally on productive firms which are on average larger. That is
why the hiring falls and firing increases considerably more among the productive firms. This is in line
with the findings of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) But the reason for difference between the small
and large firms is new relative to their analysis. A reduction in the ability of increasing debt, affects
more productive firms because their hiring depend on external financing.
4.2 Comparing the effect of productivity and financial shock
In this section I compare the impacts of financial shocks to productivity shocks in the model. This
exercise provides intuition for the difference in mechanisms at work in each case. It also provides
a benchmark to compare the magnitude and persistence of the effects across different variables. In
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order to be able to compare the impacts of these two shocks, I consider a permanent tightening of the
productivity and a permanent decline in collateral constraint such that in each case the output per
worker falls by 2.5% on impact as observed between 2008Q1 and 2008Q3.
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Figure 14: Response to a permanent decrease in collateral constraint (Transition path is shown in log
deviation from steady state. The collateral constraint shock is matched to produce 2.5% fall in labour
productivity on impact.)
Figure 14 shows the transition path in log deviation between the two steady states caused by a
11.5% tightening of collateral constraint and figure 15 shows the same after a 2.5% drop of aggregate
productivity. I first discuss the implications of an aggregate productivity shock and then compare it
with a financial shock.
A fall in aggregate productivity reduces the joint surplus of firms and workers. That discourages
new firms from entering the market as they are unable to recover the entry cost after productivity has
fallen. Moreover, firms with low productivity may not be able to afford the cost of operation anymore
27
and decide to exit the market. Therefore the total number of firms and the market tightness go down
and it becomes more difficult for unemployed workers to find a job which reduces the UE transition rate.
A lower job finding rate for unemployed workers means that the value of unemployment is lower now.
As a result, firms find it more profitable to keep their workers if the value of unemployment falls more
than the labour productivity. Productive firms may even find it profitable to post more vacancies and
hire more workers in response to the fall in the value of unemployment and the increase in probability
of job filling. That is why hiring may eventually converges to a lower level at the new steady state. As
time goes on, the layoff rate which dropped initially recovers gradually and the number of exiting firms
converges to a lower level in the new steady state.
In Appendix D.2 I show the change in the policy functions of firms in the 4th and 8th decile of
productivity distribution after the partial and general equilibrium effects caused by a fall in aggregate
productivity. And then I compare the transition path of the economy between the two steady states
with an economy without financial frictions but otherwise identical.
Comparing the effect of two shocks with a similar drop in labour productivity, one can observe
different responses of labour market variables and other aggregate variables. A financial shock triggers
a much higher unemployment rate compared with a productivity shock. This is caused by a higher
degree of layoff as well as a dipper fall in the job creation and hiring. Firms who face a tighter financial
constraint need to downsize immediately and reduce their cost of hiring in order to be able to afford the
operation cost and stay in the market. However, as time goes on, they increase their asset to be able
to collateralize more debt under a tighter financial constraint. This increase in debt lets constrained
firms reduce the lay off and in turn increase the job creation and hiring later. Instead as a result of a
productivity shock, the unemployment increase to a lower level upon the impact of shocks by a rise in
the exit of firms in the lower part of productivity distribution and gradually converges to the new steady
state. Hiring and job creation also steadily move to their new levels which are lower than the current
steady state. The high response of labour market variables including unemployment rate, job creation,
hiring and layoff are caused through two channels. The first one is a an increase in the number of exiting
firms and the second one is the labour adjustment mainly by productive firms who want to stay in the
market but to do so, they need to reduce their labour cost in a condition where they cannot borrow as
much as before. Therefore they considerably increase their layoff, reduce their job creation and hiring
and try to increase their stock of collateralizable asset to be able to survive in an economy with tighter
financial constraint. Instead, low productive firms which are not constrained do not increase the layoff
and tend to hoard more labour when the value of unemployment and therefore the cost of keeping
labour is lower. In contrast, in the case of a productivity shock, all firms are symmetrically affected by
the reduction in productivity.
Regarding to aggregate variables, the total output produced by firms falls more in the case of a pro-
ductivity shock. The existence of frictions amplifies the impact of a 2.5% fall in aggregate productivity
28
0 5 10
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
unemployment rate
0 5 10
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
job creation
0 5 10
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
layoff
0 5 10
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3 hiring
0 5 10
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
UE
0 5 10
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
EU
0 5 10
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−3 entry
0 5 10
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
exit
0 5 10
−0.01
−0.005
0
total number of firms
Figure 15: Response to a permanent decrease in aggregate productivity (Transition path is shown in
log deviation from steady state. The aggregate productivity shock is matched to produce 2.5% fall in
labour productivity on impact.)
and total output falls almost by 3% caused by a reduction in total number of firms as well as a fall in
the output produced by the existing firms. Instead, in the case of a financial shock the drop in output
is 1%. This is also caused by an increase in the number of exiting firm and also a fall in the production
of constrained firms. Figure 23 and figure 24 contain the response of debt to asset ratio and labour
to asset ratio. In the case of a financial shock, the ratio of debt to asset falls. This is initially caused
by a fall in debt but it also converges to a lower level because firms increase their stock of asset to
overcome the tighter constraint. In contrary, a fall in productivity means that the firms are in average
less constrained than before because they have a lower optimal level of capital. Therefore they reduce
both their debt and asset where here the reduction in asset is more than debt and therefore the ratio
of debt to asset goes up. The ratio of labour to asset decreases in the case of a collateral tightening
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since firms tend to accumulate more assets. But a productivity shock, which triggers a bigger fall in the
value of unemployment, also motivates the existing firms in the market to increase their labour force
and therefore the ratio of labour to asset goes up in that case. The reason behind this results is that
the cost of borrowing is exogenously set and does not change under any of the shocks while a general
equilibrium effect in the labour market reduce the cost of labour where this reduction is more in the
case of a productivity shock.
The most important difference between a financial and productivity shock comes from the impact of
a tighter collateral constraint on the allocation of resources. While a productivity shock has cleansing
effect and shift the resources toward the more productive firms, in contrast a financial shock hits the
productive firms who want to grow faster by taking more debt. A tighter constraint delays the job
creation and hiring of these firms till they gradually grow their stock of asset against which they can
take more debt. But a financial shock has also an important effect on the unproductive firms which do
not want to grow any further or are in their process of liquidation. A reduction in the demand for labour
force from productive firms reduces the cost of maintaining the current workers for the unproductive
firms. Therefore they are more eager to shrink at a slower rate and gamble on the hope of regaining
their productivity. This delay in reallocation of resources which is caused by a more sluggish upward
adjustment of productive firms and a more sluggish downward adjustment of unproductive firms affects
the productivity of labour force and further deepen the crisis. In contrast, in the case of a productivity
shock, the resources shift toward the more productive firms caused by an exit of firms in the left tail of
productivity distribution.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a dynamic search model with firm heterogeneity and frictions in both
labour and capital markets. The firm borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint which represents
the frictions in capital market. In this framework, the interaction of search and financial frictions results
in a sluggish upward adjustment of highly productive firms and also a sluggish downward adjustment
of low productivity firms. This reduces the degree of reallocation of labour and capital in comparison
to a steady state with no frictions in capital or labour markets. I use this environment to analyse the
impact of a credit tightening on labour market outcomes, such as: unemployment rate, job creation,
hiring, layoff, entry and exit. A drop in availability of credit represented by a fall in collateral constraint
results in a higher degree of misallocation of resources compared to steady state. High productivity
firms reduce their hiring and increase their layoff to accumulate more asset in order to be able to
increase their borrowing limit which in turn makes their upward adjustment even more sluggish. On
the other hand, low productivity firms shrink at a lower peace and delay their decision of liquidation
since they face a lower cost of keeping labour. I calibrate the model to a range of different UK moments
and show that the credit tightening can have a large and persistent effect on labour market variables.
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Namely, it can explain 58% of the observed increase in unemployment rate for the recession of 2008-
2010. Then, I compare the impact of a productivity shock with credit tightening and explain how in
contrast the cleansing effect results in a higher degree of reallocation of resources in the case of a drop in
productivity. This framework is quite flexible for further extensions. For instance, the block recursivity
would make it easy to use this setup and look the impact of credit tightening over the business cycles.
31
References
Acemoglu, D., and W. Hawkins (2010): “Wages and Employment Persistence with Multi-worker
Firms,” Theoretical Economics(Forthcoming).
Anyadike-Danes, M., K. Bonner, and M. Hart (2011): “Job creation and destruction in UK:
1998-2010,” BIS report.
Buera, F., R. N. Jaef, and Y. Shin (2015): “Anatomy of a credit crunch: From capital to labor
markets,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 18, 101–117.
Cui, W. (2014): “Delayed Capital Reallocation,” Manuscript, University College London.
Elsby, M. W. L., and R. Michaels (2013): “Marginal Jobs, Heterogeneous Firms and Unemploy-
ment Flows,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5, 1–45.
Elsby, M. W. L., J. C. Smith, and J. Wadsworth (2011): “The role of worker flows in the
dynamics and distribution of UK unemployment,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27, 338363.
Fujita, S., and G. Ramey (2007): “Job matching and propagation,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 31, 367198.
Garin, J. (2015): “Borrowing Constraints, Collateral Fluctuations, and the Labor Market,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 57, 112130.
Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist (1994): “Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the Behavior of
Small Manufacturing Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 309–340.
Hagedorn, M., and I. Manovskii (2008): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment
and Vacancies Revisited,” American Economic Review, 98(4), 1692–1706.
Hopenhayn, H., and R. Rogerson (1993): “Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equi-
librium Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy, 101, No. 5, 915–938.
Jermann, U., and V. Quadrini (2012): “Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks,” American
Economic Review, 102(1), 238–71.
Kaas, L., and P. Kircher (2014): “Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market,” American
Economic Review (Forthcoming).
Khan, A., and J. K. Thomas (2013): “Credit Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an Economy
with Production Heterogeneity,” Journal of Political Economy, 121(6), 1055–1107.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 105, No. 2,
211–248.
32
Melitz, M. J. (2003): “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocation and Aggregate Industry
Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.
Menzio, G., and S. Shi (2010): “Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the
job,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 14531494.
Moen, E. R. (1997): “Competitive Search Equilibrium,” The Journal of Political Economy, 105,
385–411.
Mortensen, D. T., and C. A. Pissarides (1994): “Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory
of Unemployment,” The Review of Economic Studies, 61, No. 3, 397–415.
Moscarini, G., and F. Postel-Vinay (2012): “The Contribution of Large and Small Employers
to Job Creation in Times of High and Low Unemployment,” American Economic Review, 102(6),
250939.
(2013): “Stochastic Search Equilibrium,” Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1545–81.
Pessoa, J. P., and J. van Reenen (2014): “The UK Productivity and Jobs Puzzle: Does the Answer
Lie in Wage Flexibility?,” Economic Journal, 0(576), 433–452.
Reinhart, C. M., and K. S. Rogoff (2009): “The Aftermath of Financial Crises,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 99(2), 466–72.
Schaal, E. (2015): “Uncertainty and Unemployment,” Econometrica (Revise and Resubmit).
Shimer, R. (2005): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies,” The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 95(1), 25–49.
Smith, J. C. (2011): “The Ins And Outs of UK Unemployment,” The Economic Journal, 121, 402–444.
Steven J. Davis, J. C. H., and S. Schuh (1996): “Job Creation and Destruction,” MIT Press.
Zanetti, F. (2011): “Financial Shocks and Labor Market Fluctuations,” Working paper.
Zetlin-Jones, A., and A. Shourideh (2014): “External Financing and the Role of Financial Frictions
over the Business Cycle: Measurement and Theory,” Working paper.
33
A Proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1
Given a production function, f(l, k), which is continuous, differentiable and strictly concave in l and k,
the value function of entrant firms G(a0, 0, z) is continuous and decreasing in ω. This implies that the
expected value of entry is continuous and decreasing in ω. Therefore for a fixed cost of entry, equation
(18) can have at most one solution for any C¯ > 0 and this solution exists provided that C¯ is sufficiently
small. Note that, since fl(0, k) = ∞ some entrants find it optimal to hire workers since Gl(a0, 0, z) is
higher than cost recruiting and ω.
Proof. of Proposition 2
The proof has three steps. Following Kaas and Kircher (2014) first, I show how to derive the joint
surplus maximization of firms and workers. Second I discuss the planner problem. And finally I show
that the planner problem is identical to joint surplus maximization in the decentralized economy.
Step One: Joint surplus maximization of firm and workers
The joint surplus of a firm and it’s workers can be written as:
G
({Cτ}τ∈[0,l], l, a, z) ≡ J ({Cτ}τ∈[0,l], l, a, z)+ l∑
τ=0
lτ
[
W (Cτ , z)− U
]
(22)
Using (3) and (4), the worker surplus satisfies:
W (Cτ , z)− U = wτ − b− ω + βφτ (z)Ez
[
W (C, z′)− U]
Also substituting (6) and (7) into (5):
J
({Cτ}τ∈[0,l], l, a, z) = max
d,v,θ,C,k,a′
Azf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ −
l∑
0
wτ lτ − cv − cf+
(23)
β(1− d)EzJ
({Cτ}τ∈[0,l′], l′, a′, z′)
Now substituting the surplus of workers and (23) into (22). This problem is subject to (8), (9) and
(10), 11.
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G (.) = max
d,v,θ,C,k,a′
{
Azf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ −
l∑
τ=0
lτwτ − cv − cf + β(1− d)EzJ(.)
}
+
l∑
τ=0
lτ
[
wτ − b− ω + βφτEz
[
W (Cτ , z′)− U
]]
= max
d,v,θ,C,k,a′
{
Azf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ − [b+ ω]l − cv − cf + β(1− d)EzJ(.)+
β
l∑
τ=0
lτφτEz
[
W (Cτ , z′)− U
]}
= max
d,v,θ,C,k,a′
{
Azf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ − bl − ω[l + 1
θ
v]− cv − cf + β(1− d)EzJ(.)+
(1− d)β
l′∑
τ=0
lτ+Ez
[
W (Cτ , z′)− U
]}
= max
d,v,θ,C,k,a′
{
Azf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ − bl − ω[l + 1
θ
v]− cv − cf + β(1− d)EzG(.)
}
Here maximization is always subject to (8) and (9) and the third equation makes use of
(1− d)lτ+ = φτ (z)lτ
and
ω
1
θ
v = β(1− d)p(θ)vEz
[
W (Cτ , z′)− U
]
This equation shows the joint surplus maximization of firm and workers in a decentralized economy.
Step two: Planner problem
At every period and for every firm type, the planner decides, how much to borrow or lend x, how much
fund to save a′, an exit probability d, a separation rate µ, the number of vacancies v , and a matching
probability θ. Also the planner decides the mass of new entrants N0 ≥ 0
The sequential planning problem is:
max
d,µ,v,θ,k,a′,N0
∑
t≥0
βtψt{−CN0 +
∑
y
N(y)
[
Azf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ − bl − cf − cv
]}
(24)
Subject to the law of motion for firms (20), workers (21) aggregate resource constraint (19) and
financial constraint (9)
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I first write the recursive formulation of the planner problem and then prove the equivalence between
the recursive and sequential formulation. Where βtψtη is the multiplier on resource constraint 19.
Therefore let P (a, l, z) denotes the recursive formulation of the social value of a firm with a stock of
asset, l stock of employment and idiosyncratic productivity z.
P (a, l, z) = max
d,µ,θ,v,k,a′
Azf(l, k)+(1−δ)k−(1+r)(k−a)−a′−bl−η[l+ 1
θ
v]−cv−cf+β(1−d)EzP (a′, l′, z′)
(25)
Lemma 2 :
a) For any given multipliers η there exists value functions P : R+×B×Y → R satisfying the system
of recursive equations (25).
b) If (N, l, v, θ, δ, µ, a′) is a solution of the planning problem (24) then the corresponding firm policies
also solve problem (24) and the complementarity slackness condition
∑
z
ν(z0)G(a0, 0, z) ≤ C , N0 ≥ 0
is satisfied. Conversely, if this vector solves for every firm problem (24) with multiplier η, and if
the complimentary slackness and resource constraint hold for the z, then the is a solution of the
planning problem (25)
Proof. of Lemma 2
Part a) The RHS in the system of equations in (25) defines an operator T which maps a sequence of
bounded functions P = (Pt)t≥0, with Pt : [0, l¯]× [0, a¯]× Y × Z → R] such that ||P || ≡ supt||Pt|| <∞,
into another sequence of bounded functions P˜ = (P˜ )t with ||P || ≡ supt||P˜t|| < ∞. Here l¯ and a¯ are
sufficiently large such that the decisions for labour (l) and capital (k) never binds for any l ∈ [0, l¯]
and a ∈ [0, a¯].The existence of l¯ and a¯ follows from Inada condition for f : the marginal product of
an additional worker or unit of capital must be negative for any z ∈ Z, for all l′ ≥ l¯ or a′ ≥ a¯ with
sufficiently large l¯ or a¯; hence no hiring will occur beyond l¯ and no investment will happen beyond
a¯. Because the operator satisfies Blackwells sufficient conditions, it is a contraction in the space of
bounded function sequences P . Hence, the operator T has a unique fixed point which is a sequence of
bounded functions.
Part b) Take first a solution S of the planning problem, and write βtφtη ≥ 0 for the multipliers on the
aggregate resource constraint. Then S maximizes the Lagrange function
L = max
d,µ,v,θ,k,a′,N0
∑
t≥0
βtψt
{
− CN0 +
∑
z
N(z)
[
zf(l, k) + (1− δ)k − (1 + r)(k − a)− a′ − cf − cv
]
+ η
[
l +
1
θ
v
]}
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For each individual firm, this problem is the sequential formulation of the recursive problem (25) with
multipliers η. Hence, firm policies also solve the recursive problem; furthermore, the maximum of the
Lagrange function is the same as the sum of the social values of entrant firms plus the social values of
firms which already exist at t = 0, namely,
L = max
N0
∑
t≥0
βtψtN0
[
−C +
∑
z
ν0(z)G(a0, 0, z)
]
+
∑
t
φz
∑
z
N(z)G0(a, l.z)
This also proves that the complementary-slackness condition describes optimal entry.
Step three: The equivalence of planner and decentralized market problem
Provided that η = ω, the firm joint surplus maximization in decentralized market (14) is identical
to planner problem (25). The only difference is that the firm commit to cohort specific retention
probabilities, while planner chooses an alike separation probability for all workers within a firm every
period. But both problems have the same answer as both are the dynamic optimization decision of
a single decision maker with the same states and payoff functions. This means that the solution to
both problems regarding to, investment, saving, vacancy posting, choosing the submarket, lay off and
exit are identical. Moreover, the free entry conditions in both problems are the same. When η = ω,
the value of entry in (14) is the same as (25) and therefore given the aggregate resource constraint the
measure and distribution of entrants are the same in both problems.
Proof. of Lemma 1
FOCs of problem 14 with respect to θ and v, where χ is the muti[lier on constraint 10:
∂G
∂θ : ω
1
θ2
v + β(1− d)E ∂G∂lt+1 p′(θ)v + χ(ω 1θ2 v) = 0
∂G
∂v : −ω 1θ − c+ β(1− d)E ∂G∂lt+1 p(θ) + χ(−ω 1θ − c) = 0
Substituting the first FOC into the second one:
ω
θ
(−p(θ)
p′(θ)θ
− 1
)
= c
Where ξ(θ) = p
′(θ)θ
p(θ) < 0 is the elasticity of firm’s matching function. ξ(θ) is decreasing in θ for a
CES matching function and is constant for Cobb-Douglas matching function.
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B Calibration and numerical implementations
This section explains the numerical implementation of the model solution and other numerical exercises
in the paper.
B.1 Computing the stationary equilibrium
To solve the model numerically I follow Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and construct my algorithm
based on the definition of equilibrium in 2.9. The problem of (14), (15), (16), (8), (9), (10), (11) and
(12) define two nested fixed point problem that must be solved to find the equilibrium. The value
functions are solved on a nl× na× nz grid where the number of grid points in my bassline calibration
is the following: (nl = 60, na = 60, nz = 10)
The algorithm consists of three steps:
The first step, uses condition (5) to find the unique value of ω that is consistent with free entry
in equilibrium. For any given ω one can compute the value functions and check if the expected value
of entry is equal to the cost of entry. This yields firm value functions G(a, l, z), as wel as the policu
functions d, µ, θ, v, x and a.
The second step, find N up to a scale factor. One can use the policy functions and Markov process
to compute the transition function T . A stationary equilibrium requires a pair (N,N0) such that N is
a fixed point of T (N,N0, ω). Given ω and N0 the operator T has a fixed point.
The third step, determines the scale factor N0. Once a fixed N¯ has been found, the equilibrium
must also satisfy the aggregate resource condition
∑
z
N(z)
[
l(z) +
1
θ(z)
v(z)
]
= 1
The left hand side of this equation is linearly homogenous in N0 and the right hand side is constant,
therefore there must be a unique N0 that satisfies this equation.
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C Data description
C.1 UK aggregate data
• Output is taken from the ONS (office for national statistics). I use quarterly and seasonally
adjusted GDP in Pound Sterling from 2000Q1 to 2012Q4.
• Productivity is seasonally adjusted and taken from ONS. It measure as output per worker YL over
the period 2000Q1 to 2012Q4.
• Unemployment rate is quarterly, seasonally adjusted and constructed by ONS from Labour Force
Survey over the period 2000Q1 to 2012Q4.
• The number of vacancies is quarterly, seasonally adjusted and constructed by ONS from Vacancy
Survey over the period 2000Q1 to 2012Q4. The total number of vacancies excludes Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing.
• The time series of unemployment to employment (UE) and employment to unemployment (UE)
transition rates are taken from Smith (2011)14. over the period 2000Q1 to 2012Q4.
• The total lending to private non-financial corporations are in Pound Sterling, quarterly, seasonally
adjusted and taken from bank of England data set.
C.2 Credit Conditions Survey
The first Credit Conditions Survey was conducted in 2007 Q2 and additional questions have been
included since 2007 Q4. A full set of results is available in Excel on the Banks website at:
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/other/monetary/creditconditions.aspx
Positive balances indicate that lenders, on balance, reported/expected demand/credit availabil-
ity/defaults to be higher than over the previous/current three-month period, or that the terms and
conditions on which credit was provided became cheaper or looser respectively. Where the survey bal-
ances are discussed, descriptions of a significant change refer to a net percentage balance greater than
20 in absolute terms, and a slight change refers to a net percentage balance of between 5 and 10 in
absolute terms. Survey balances between 0 and 5 in absolute terms are described as unchanged.
To calculate aggregate results, each lender is assigned a score based on their response. Lenders
who report that credit conditions have changed a lot are assigned twice the score of those who report
that conditions have changed a little. These scores are then weighted by lenders market shares. The
14The data is constructed by Jennifer C Smith and is available on her webpage at https://sites.google.com/site/
jcsmithecon/data
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Figure 16: Data are shown in log deviation from the first quarter of 2008 when the first rise in unem-
ployment has been observed. The time series of EU and UE has been available till the first quarter of
2010.
results are analysed by calculating net percentage balances the difference between the weighted bal-
ance of lenders reporting that, for example, demand was higher/lower or terms and conditions were
tighter/looser. The net percentage balances are scaled to lie between 100. This annex reports the
net percentage balance of respondents for each question in the corporate lending questionnaire, includ-
ing specific questions for private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) and other financial corporations
(OFCs).
Q: How has the proportion of loan applications from medium/large PNFCs being approved changed?
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Figure 17: The overall change in proportion of loan applications from medium/large PNFCs being
approved
C.3 FAME
I obtain data on UK firms from the FAME data set created by the Bureau van Dijk through UCL library
website. Fame combines the filed balance sheet data at Company House. I restrict my attention to the
firms located in UK and construct a balance panel where at each year I can observe, total employment,
total asset and total debt of a firm. I define total debt, as the sum of short term and long term debt
for each firm. I exclude firms with negative asset (three observations). My final data set contains 9872
firms which I can follow them and observe the three aforementioned variables from 2005 to 2011.
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Figure 18: FAME: UK annual firm level data. The blue line corresponds to firms who increased their
debt from 2005 to 2007 and the red line corresponds to firms who decreased their debt from 2005 to
2007.
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D Additional figures
D.1 Financial tightening
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Figure 19: The top graph is the joint distribution of firms over labour and asset at steady state. The
middle graph shows how this distribution changes after partial equilibrium effect and the bottom graph
shows the shift after general equilibrium effect.
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Figure 20: The firm distribution over asset and labour at steady state and after partial and general
equilibrium effect.
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Figure 21: Firm’s optimal strategy after a negative productivity shock (partial equilibrium effect).
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Figure 22: Firms optimal strategy after a negative productivity shock (general equilibrium effect).
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D.2 Productivity Shocks: Policy functions
D.3 Transition path
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Figure 23: Response to a permanent decrease in collateral constraint (Transition path is shown in log
deviation from steady state. The collateral constraint shock is matched to produce 2.5% fall in labour
productivity on impact.)
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Figure 24: Response to a permanent decrease in aggregate productivity (Transition path is shown in
log deviation from steady state. The aggregate productivity shock is matched to produce 2.5% fall in
labour productivity on impact.)
E Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, I study the sensitivity of the quantitative exercise to different magnitude of a fall
in collateral constraint. I illustrate how the models implication for the amplification and propagation
of impulse responses are sensitive to the drop in λ. In the first exercise represented by black lines,
the initial drop in λ is half of the benchmark experiment in section 4. The responses of labour market
variables depicted in figure 25 shows that even such a smaller drop in λ can generate a sizable fluctuation
in labour market variables. The response of unemployment rate, job creation, hiring and lay off are
only slightly less than the main experiment represented by blue lines and apart from UE rates, the
responses of other variables show same persistence. However, the other aggregate variables such as
total output, labour productivity and debt fall by less than half of the main experiment and revert back
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to the steady state much quicker. This suggests that even a slight change in responses of the labour
market variables can be translated into sizable difference in other macroeconomics variables such as
total output, labour productivity and debt. In other words, since the productive firms are most affected
by the collateral tightening, a reduction in the fall of λ is translated into a much higher production
by those firms such that the total production falls by less than half. This is even more evident in the
third exercise represented by red lines where the collateral constraint only fall by 10%. The change in
labour market variables depicted in figure 25 are considerably less than the bench mark experiment. For
instance, the unemployment rate and layoff increase by less than half and job creation and hiring fall by
less than half. This differences in the responses of labour market variables are translated into a bigger
differences in the responses of other aggregate macroeconomics variables depicted in 26. Total output,
labour productivity and total debt fall by much less compared to benchmark experiment and revert
to the steady state much faster. This also suggests that the effect of collateral tightening on labour
market and macroeconomic variables is not linear. This is mainly due to the non-linearity of production
function and the fact that the main driven of a financial recession is the change in employment policy
of productive firms15.
15in figure 27 I have plotted the impulse responses functions in the above mentioned exercises for the productive and
unproductive firms. The change in fall of λ affects the hiring and firing decisions of productive and unproductive firms
differently. However, change in the employment of productive firms results in a responses of macroeconomics variables.
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Figure 25: Blue line corresponds to the benchmark analysis where λ falls by 45%. Black line corresponds
to a fall of 22.5% in λ and red line is an exercise where the collateral constraint falls by 10%. In all
three exercises λ reverts back to the initial steady state at a rate of 9.5%(Impulse responses are shown
in log deviation from steady state.).
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Figure 26: Blue line corresponds to the benchmark analysis where λ falls by 45%. Black line corresponds
to a fall of 22.5% in λ and red line is an exercise where the collateral constraint falls by 10%. In all
three exercises λ reverts back to the initial steady state at a rate of 9.5%(Impulse responses are shown
in log deviation from steady state.).
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Figure 27: Blue line corresponds to the benchmark analysis where λ falls by 45%. Black line corresponds
to a fall of 22.5% in λ and red line is an exercise where the collateral constraint falls by 10%. In all three
exercises λ reverts back to the initial steady state at a rate of 9.5%(Impulse responses are shown in log
deviation from steady state.). Productive firms: firms with productivity above the median productivity.
Unproductive firms: firms with productivity below the median productivity.
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